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Abstract
This paper studies fiscal policy behavior with regard to sustainability for the
group of the eight eastern new member states (NMS) which joined the European
Union (EU) in 2004. Using the approach of Bohn (1995, 1998) the fiscal reaction
function is estimated for the years 1995 until 2013. Further, by separating the re-
sponse in periods before and after accession, it is possible to study potential changes
in fiscal sustainability. The results of the panel regressions reveal a positive statisti-
cally significant reaction coefficient, indicating sustainable behavior. Moreover, the
separated responses before and after 2004 signify a stronger reaction ahead of the
accession. Plus, effects of the crisis should be taken into account.
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1 Introduction
With the recent crisis, aspects of fiscal sustainability evoke as the public budget situation
impaired, fiscal deficits increased and the debt situation regained particular interest. This
development was accompanied by a severe recession. Due to that, regular budget sourcing
through tax revenues aggravated and sustainability of public finances was challenged.
Many economies worldwide were hit by the financial and debt crisis, however, Europe was
affected especially strong. This situation was not limited to Western European economies
like Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Spain, who had to apply for financial assistance. Central
and Eastern European Union members, like Slovenia for instance, and potential future new
member states in Eastern Europe were affected, too, and suffered from serious difficulties.
As mentioned by Staehr (2010) for instance Latvia and Hungary suffered from severe
problems leading to bailouts.
In this context it is important to recall that for EU members the Maastricht Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact require sound fiscal positions, as it is recorded in Art. 121 of
the treaty. These requirements intensify the sustainability considerations for all member
states. Relating to that it is interesting to consider the EU’s first eastward enlargement
of 2004. On May 1st 2004 the ten countries Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia were joining the union and all
of them had to fulfill the obligations to become member states. However, in view of
the current economic situation in Europe some question in this context arise for the new
member states (NMS)1 as regards fiscal sustainability. Therefore, this study contributes
to research on sustainability in NMS by analyzing whether the governments of the NMS
pursue sustainable fiscal policies and whether EU membership has changed fiscal policy
behavior. This becomes especially relevant since 2014 is the 10 year commemoration of the
EU’s eastward enlargement. These are the central research questions for this study, which
will be analyzed empirically using the fiscal response approach of Bohn (1995, 1998). The
idea is to test whether a government reacts in a counter-acting manner with its primary
balance to changes in its debt situation. In a second step, the accession in 2004 is taken
into account by analyzing if this policy behavior changed before and after joining the EU.
The study is conducted with annual data for the period from 1995 to 2013. This allows
1 This study concentrates on the eastern NMS, thus, in line with Stanek (2014), Cyprus and Malta
are not considered here.
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to cover some years of the transition phase as well as the recent troubles with the crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a literature overview
covering both, empirical studies on sustainability in general and those with special focus
on Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), section 3 presents the data set and
the estimations and their results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature overview
Several papers in the economics literature address fiscal sustainability aspects, mainly
based on the concept of the inter-temporal budget constraint. Here, the focus is set on
empirical contributions. As Chalk and Hemming (2000) pointed out, there is basically
two lines of sustainability research, indicators and time series approaches. The former
presents sustainability information in one figure, as for instance suggested by Blanchard
et al. (1990) or Blanchard (1990). However, this ease also comes along with several draw-
backs.2 The other type started with a seminal paper by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), who
utilize stationarity tests to assess traits of the present value budget constraint. Within
this branch, mainly three approaches of testing for fiscal sustainability emerged. Trehan
and Walsh (1991) suggest to test for the stationarity properties of the budget deficit in
order to test for fiscal sustainability. Sustainability is inferred for stationary deficits, as-
suming that the variable real interest rate is positive. Hakkio and Rush (1991) propose
a co-integration test. Sustainability is reasoned for if public revenues and expenditures
are co-integrated. Bohn (1995, 1998) introduces fiscal response functions. If the primary
surplus ratio reacts in an enhancing manner to increases of the public debt ratio, fiscal
sustainability seems to be given. For an overview and discussion of fiscal sustainability
approaches see e.g. Afonso (2005) or Chalk and Hemming (2000).
Many applications have followed. To mention just a few (arbitrarily) selected ones: for in-
stance, Sawada (1994) studies sustainability for some Latin American and Asian countries
according to the first two approaches mentioned above, i.e. Trehan and Walsh (1991) and
Hakkio and Rush (1991). Whereas, for example, Burger (2012) and Fincke and Greiner
(2011a) utilize Bohn (1995, 1998)’s approach in order to calculate stabilized debt ratio
values for the US and UK or detect changes in the response over time for certain EU
2 For a more detailed discussion on these literature approaches see for example Fincke (2012).
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(crisis) economies, respectively.
However, concerning specifically Eastern European countries the amount of contributions
becomes more sparsely. Many early papers focus on the role of fiscal policy in the transi-
tion process, i.e. the phase of shift from planned to market economies. In a recent paper,
Shabunina (2013) portrays the (chronological) development of the fiscal policy situation
in transition economies, starting with the early phase in the 1990s until the recent period
with the crisis. She takes heterogeneity of the countries into account by distinguishing
different groups (per phase) and illustrates the discussion by data and statistics on bud-
get variables. Her overview shows that there has been some improvement in fiscal policy
in CEECs, however, challenges remain. Further, for instance Darvas (2009) reflects the
role of the current crisis on fiscal policy in CEECs. Using statistics and structural vector-
autoregressions he stresses the influence of high private debt, dependence on international
relations (trade and capital flow) and pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. Accordingly, the cri-
sis should be taken as a chance for reforms and improvement.
As concerns sustainability studies, there are some that focus on indicators, Budina and
Van Wijnbergen (1997) for instance. Adapted from the government’s inter-temporal bud-
get constraint, they calculate sustainable primary balances which aim at stabilizing the
debt to GDP ratio. With these indicators they distinguish three groups: sustainable
economies, borderline cases and unsustainable countries. They find that sustainable coun-
tries have lower inflation and they grow earlier and faster. Later, Aristovnik and Bercic
(2007) also study fiscal sustainability by calculating indicators for the (required) fiscal
balance and public debt ratios. They take annual data for 24 transition economies and
distinguish three groups: Central and Eastern Europe, Southern and Eastern Europe and
Commonwealth of Independent States. Their results indicate that some countries don’t
pursue sustainable policies, in particular they mention Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Albania and Croatia.
Going beyond indicators, other contributions employ time series analysis. For instance,
Stanek (2014) analyses debt sustainability in the NMS by conducting panel data station-
arity tests on the debt to GDP ratio for quarterly data from 2000 to 2013. He studies
whether Euro-zone members of the group behave different than the others, where he also
runs subsamples with/without the crisis years. His results yield that Euro-zone members
do not perform better than the other CEECs concerning debt sustainability. Llorca and
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Redzepagic (2008), for example, test for sustainability with the co-integration approach.
They analyze the government spending and revenue development with a panel of quarterly
data for eight selected new EU member states; their results indicate sustainability. And,
Stoian and Câmpeanu (2010) analyze fiscal sustainability in CEECs by applying Bohn’s
fiscal response approach for instance. They estimate regression equations individually for
all ten economies with OLS based on quarterly data for 2000 until 2008. The results are
mixed, they indicate sustainable behavior for some countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia and Lithuania), whereas others (Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) face dif-
ficulties. Also, Staehr (2010) and Baldi and Staehr (2013) utilize fiscal response functions
to study the public finance situation in CEECs with a special focus on the current crisis.
Baldi and Staehr (2013) analyze fiscal reaction functions before and after the current crisis
- and possible changes - in order to explain the different fiscal performance situation of EU
economies. They utilize panel regressions for different groups of EU members, diversified
by characteristics of integration (in this way including CEECs) and crisis impact, with
quarterly data from 2000-2012 in separated two-part (pre-crisis and post-crisis) estima-
tions. They find a change in policy: with only a slight and rather similar response before
the crisis, but a stronger debt effect after 2008, especially for crisis-affected economies.
By applying Bohn’s approach, this paper goes into a similar direction like Stoian and
Câmpeanu (2010) and Baldi and Staehr (2013), however, a special focus is set on the
2004 enlargement, meaning, this contribution not only tests sustainability for the eastern
NMS in general, but especially accounts for the behavior before and after EU accession.
Moreover, the data set runs from 1995 until 2013 with annual data, allowing to include
the early stage as well as the recent crisis.
3 Empirics
This section presents the empirical estimations and results. Ahead of that, some infor-
mation on the data set is present to get a first impression of the public finance situation
in the eight countries under consideration.
4
3.1 Dataset
The data set covers annual data for the years from 1995 until 2013 for the eight eastern
NMS that joined in 2004: Estonia, Latvia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovak Republic.3 In order to test for sustainable behavior in the NMS with
Bohn (1995, 1998)’s fiscal response approach, the focus is set on the two central variables
primary balance to GDP ratio and public debt to GDP ratio. To get a first visual im-
pression, figures 1 and 2 depict their development.
The primary balance reveals a rather wiggly behavior with most movement in terms
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Figure 1: Primary balance NMS (1995-2013)
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Figure 2: Public debt ratio NMS (1995-2013)
3 Again, the focus is set on the eastern NMS, thus, Cyprus and Malta are not considered here.
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of (smaller) deficits. Summarizing the primary balance ratio across time and countries
yields a value of -1.72 %, indicating that on average the NMS run primary deficits over
this time horizon. As regards the public debt ratio the initial situation in the Baltic states
for instance was characterized by very low values, whereas Hungary revealed a value of
84.5 %, which decreased until the early 2000s. Also, the strong increase of the Slovenian
public debt ratio is noteworthy, which almost quadrupled from 18% in 1995 to 70% in
2013. Certainly, the recent crisis is visible in the most current observations.
For the estimations the data set is used as a panel, meaning the NMS are treated as a
group unlike other country-by-country studies such as Stoian and Câmpeanu (2010) for
instance. The reason for this is to analyze the common behavior across all NMS (due
to the accession), rather than individual country actions. Plus, for such a procedure the
series are likely to be too short. In order to incorporate the different behavior before and
after the accession, the data series are separated after 2003. Since the data set refers
to annual data and the NMS joined on May 1st 2004, most of that year they were EU
members, thus, it is reckoned for the second part
Due to availability the data set has been constructed using different (but few) sources.
GDP and the deflator stem from International Monetary Fund (2014). The primary bal-
ance and public debt ratio mainly come from European Central Bank (2015), seldomly
missing observations have been supplemented (after careful examination of trend and
neighbors) by OECD (2014) entries (Estonian and Czech public debt and primary bal-
ance data, however, mainly stems from the latter source.)4. Total public spending has
mainly been extracted from AMECO (2015), rarely missing data has been supplemented
by International Monetary Fund (2014) observations. Appendix A provides a more de-
tailed data set description.
Due to utilization of lagged debt ratio variable in the regressions, the series for all vari-
ables in the estimations cover the years from 1996-2013, except for the debt ratio, which
runs from 1995 to 2012. For both figures, from a first rough descriptive and graphical
impression, no particular impact of the 2004 enlargement is directly visible. Therefore,
in a next step, the response function according to Bohn (1995, 1998) will be estimated in
order to analyze the fiscal sustainability behavior further.
4 For Latvia the primary balance ratio data for 2010-2012 have been calculated manually by resorting
to Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2015) and World Bank (2015), see appendix A for details.
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3.2 Estimation results
For a more profound analysis, the following regression for a simple OLS Panel model will
be estimated:
psi,t = α0 + γ bi,t−1 +
∑
j
αjZj,i,t + i,t, (1)
where psi,t indicates the primary balance to GDP ratio for country i at time t. The
variable b represents the public debt to GDP ratio and  is the error term. The vector
of the control variables is denoted by Zj,i,t. These additional aspects are twofold: they
contain a variable, which is motivated by the tax smoothing hypothesis, stating that
a government shall run public deficits in order to keep the tax rates constant. So, a
term is included to account for fluctuations: a business cycle variable, Y Gap, which is
constructed like an output gap ratio, i.e. (Yt−Y
∗)
Y ∗ , with Y for the real GDP and Y
∗ its
trend constructed with a moving average.5 Moreover, the inflation rate Infl is included,
as it accounts for changes in the price level and captures some influence from monetary
policy. The debt ratio is included in lagged terms. On the one hand, economically, this
allows to capture the actual response on realized (past) values of the debt ratio. On the
other hand, technically, this mitigates endogeneity.
Since the focus is set on whether the 2004 enlargement did change this fiscal behavior in
the context of sustainability for the eight eastern NMS, in a next step the main effect and
the response parameter γ will be dismantled in order to account for different behavior
before and after accession separately. Thus, two interaction terms are introduced, which
capture the fiscal response in the two periods (BA= before accession, i.e. (1996-2003)
and AA= after accession, i.e. (2004-2013)), respectively. They are constructed with a
Dummy D containing ones and zeros:6
psi,t = φ0 + γBA bi,t−1 ∗DBA + γAA bi,t−1 ∗DAA +
∑
j
φjZj,i,t + i,t. (2)
For both equations three model types are estimated: a simple pooled model, a fixed effects
model and a random effects model. Table 1 summarizes the information on the reaction
coefficients.7
5 For a similar approach, using the HP-Filter, see for instance Fincke and Greiner (2011b).
6 For instance DBA contains ones for the years 1996 until 2003 and zeros afterwards.
7 Full estimation outcomes are reported in appendix A. All estimation are implemented with package
plm in R 3.1.2.
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Common effect pooled fixed effects random effects
γ 0.018• 0.050* 0.026•
F Test F = 3.739 p-val.=0.000995
Hausman Test χ2 = 44.142 p-val.=1.41 · 10−9
Separated effects pooled fixed effects random effects
γBA 0.013 0.060* 0.025
γAA 0.020• 0.052* 0.026•
F Test F = 3.726 p-val.=0.00103
Hausman Test χ2 = 31.845 p-val.=2.06 · 10−6
Signf. levels **(1% level) *(5% level) •(10% level)
Table 1: Estimation results for the reaction coefficient.
The first part of table 1 presents the outcomes of the estimation of equation (1) for all
model types. γ presents the common response parameter for the eastern NMS, indicat-
ing whether their governments reacted to changes in their public debt ratio by adjusting
their primary balance ratios. A positive coefficient signifies sustainable behavior as, for
instance, an increase in the debt ratio goes along with enhancing the primary surplus
(or reducing deficits). The results reveal a positive and significant coefficient, indicating
sustainable fiscal behavior for the group of the eastern NMS for the years from 1996 to
2013. Some tests for the more appropriate model type are conducted: the F test com-
pares the pooled model and the fixed effects model, small p-values suggest to choose the
fixed effects model. The Hausman test compares the fixed effects model with the random
effects model, again a small p-value suggest the fixed effects model. The tests indicate
that the fixed effects model seems to be most suitable here. However, the central result
of sustainability is affirmed for all three specifications (model types).
Moreover, the second part of table 1 present the estimation outcomes of the segregated fis-
cal reactions. The coefficients γBA and γAA both possess a positive sign for all estimation
types. Interestingly, for the pooled and the random effects model, only the coefficients
for the period after 2004 are statistically significant, whereas in the fixed effects model
both are significant. However, the tests indicate that the fixed effects model is the better
choice. Referring to that fixed effects model, the estimation of the separated fiscal reac-
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tion reveals additional information: by splitting the response into periods before and after
accession, the reaction seems to be stronger in the years before 2004. This holds true for
both, the magnitude of the coefficient as well as the significance level. Economically this
makes clear sense, as the countries were putting strong effort and emphasis on fulling the
criteria for the membership.
In order to test further on the estimations, some robustness checks were conducted. For
instance, the estimations are run with a truncated sample, cutting the data set after
2008 leaving out all crisis observations. The results confirm the outcomes presented in
table 1.8 Again, the fixed effects model seems to present the best choice, for which the
reaction coefficients are significantly positive. Plus, for the separated responses, the re-
action was stronger before accession. If the regressions are implemented in manner of
Baldi and Staehr (2013), that is cutting or splitting the whole data set in between 2003
and 2004, and running the estimations with two (unrestricted) models before accession
(1996-2003) and after accession (2004-2013) (compared to the restricted, full time span
model as discussed above), yields some interesting additional insights. For the pre-EU-
phase the positive debt reaction presents the only significant effect in the model, whereas
in the post-accession model the business cycle variable becomes the only significant influ-
ence (positive sign). This supports the findings from above by stressing the debt response
effect ahead of the entry, which can be interpreted as the enhanced efforts, and also
indicating potential crisis influences afterwards. Moreover, if the second period of the
unrestricted model is run until 2008 only (i.e. 2004-2008), this splitted model allows to
account for potential crisis effects. It yields for the second phase not only a significant
Y Gap coefficient but also a significant (strong) positive response parameter. Obviously,
as regards debt sustainability, there is a crucial influence of the crisis, which should not
be neglected.9 Moreover, if the fluctuation is measured by a different variable, that is in
terms of deviations of total public expenditure from its trend, GGap, which is constructed
similar to Y Gap, the positive sign of the reaction coefficient remains, however, there is a
loss of significance.
8 Only the pooled model looses significance for the reaction coefficient (but it misses the 10% reference
value only closely for the common response.)
9 Here, even for running a simple model (without controls, i.e. the lagged debt ratio variable is the
single explanatory variable) it’s also crucial to take the crisis effect into account as the response only
becomes significant for the truncated sample (cutting after 2008).
9
Summing up, there are some indications for fiscal sustainability in the eight eastern NMS
for the considered time period. Relating this result to other literature contribution is kind
of tricky, as for instance Stoian and Câmpeanu (2010), Aristovnik and Bercic (2007), Baldi
and Staehr (2013) or Stanek (2014) work with a different testing framework: the first two
contributions perform country-by-country studies yielding mixed results for sustainable
behavior and Baldi and Staehr (2013) and Stanek (2014) have put the focus on a com-
parison of pre-crisis and post-crisis behavior or Euro-zone to Non-Euro-zone members,
respectively. Nevertheless, the results presented in table 1 offer some new and current
empirical research regarding sustainability studies for Eastern European Union members
with special emphasis on the 2004 accession. Certainly, further research this direction in
the future is necessary in order to study the fiscal behavior of EU applicant countries or
future EU members.
4 Summary
This paper studies the fiscal policy behavior for the group of the eight eastern new member
states which joined the European Union in 2004. The approach of Bohn (1995, 1998) is
used to estimate the fiscal reaction function with annual data for the years 1995 until 2013
with panel regressions. By separating the response in periods before and after accession,
it is possible to study potential changes in fiscal sustainability behavior. The results
of the estimations reveal a positive statistically significant reaction coefficient indicating
sustainable behavior. This results is shown for all three model types, i.e. pooled OLS,
fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects type presents the most suitable model.
In a second step, the responses are estimated separately in order to capture the behavior
before and after 2004. Again, the fixed effects estimation presents the best model choice.
The outcome signifies a stronger reaction ahead of the accession, this is reasonable from
an economic point of view, as it covers the preparation phase before joining the EU
and shows the effort of fulfilling the qualification criteria. Moreover, the estimations
indicate considerable influence of the current crisis on the sustainability situation, which
should be kept in mind for the interpretation. Certainly, these results only hold true
for the considered time period. In order to maintain the sustainable fiscal situation, the
governments of the economies need to continue pursuing their counter-acting behavior
and adhere to that policy.
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A Additional data information and estimation results
This section provides additional information on the data set, which has been constructed
by resorting to different but few sources. Table 2 summarizes the central information.
Please note, for Latvia the observations for the primary balance ratio 2010-2012 have
been calculated manually by resorting to Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2015) and
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Variable Source No. of obs. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Min. Max. St.D.
Primary balance ECB (2015) 144 -1.72 -4.84 0.09 1.16
OECD (2014)
Public debt ECB (2015) 144 31.40 25.16 46.80 6.64
OECD (2014)
YGap GDP: IMF (2014) 144 3.10 -5.40 6.19 2.78
Defl.: IMF (2014)
Infl Defl.: IMF (2014) 144 4.82 0.56 14.17 3.29
GGap Exp.: AMECO (2015) 144 1.56 -1.80 3.61 1.46
IMF (2014)
Defl.: IMF (2014)
Table 2: Detailed data information (own calculations).
World Bank (2015), meaning the primary spending has been calculated by correcting
total expenditures by interest payments. Further, Lithuania’s public debt ratio data for
2000-2003 stem from International Monetary Fund (2014).
The descriptive statistics refer to the averages cross countries of the actually used data
in the regressions, meaning for the eight eastern NMS with data from 1996-2013, except
for the lagged debt ratio (1995-2012). The (local) trend for calculating Y Gap and GGap
has been computed with moving averages: 3-periods for Y Gap (except for Lithuania and
Czech, for which only 2-period steps were possible) and 2-periods for GGap. Plus, they
are computed backward-looking in order to use available observations. The statistics re-
veal, that for the group of the eight NMS the primary balance ratio was in deficit on
average, with the maximum group primary deficit of almost 5% in 2009 and the largest
group value of nearly 1% in 2007. The average value for the debt ratio in the NMS is
31.4 % with the lowest value of about 25% in 1999 and the highest value of 46.8% in
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2013 with the crisis. The average output gap ratio for the considered period is 3.1%, with
the minimum in 2009 and the highest value in 2007. The average inflation in the group
was about 5%, with the lowest value in 2010 and the maximum of 14.17% in 1996. On
average, government spending was above the trend, interestingly, the maximum of 3.6%
was run in 2008, whereas minimum of almost 2% was run in 2010. The latter number
indicating that in that year, public expenditures were below its trend (measured as ratio
to trend), which could be assigned to enforced consolidation/ austerity measures. When-
ever necessary adjustment to Euro has been calculated according to the official rate, for
instance for some Lithuanian data with 3.45280 LTL = 1 e.
As regards the stationarity properties of the series utilized in the regression, ahead of the
estimations Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test have been conducted. They reveal stationarity
for all variables except the debt ratio. However, with p− value = 0.1691 it comes rather
close. Further, Burger (2012, pp. 937f.) discusses this issue and points out that Bohn
didn’t particularly check stationarity of the series. Here, stationarity (or relatively close
proximity) is assumed.
The full estimation results for equations (1) and (2) are given as follows:
1) For the general and common response:
summary( pool )
Oneway ( i nd i v i dua l ) e f f e c t Pool ing Model
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Err t−va l Pr(>| t | )
( I n t e r c ep t ) −3.687 0 .459 −8.03 3 .623 e−13 ∗∗∗
DebtRatio 0 .018 0 .010 1 .75 0.08233 .
YGap 0.279 0 .057 4 .89 2 .682 e−06 ∗∗∗
I n f l 0 .113 0 .047 2 .44 0.01589 ∗
−−−
Sign . codes : 0 ’∗∗∗ ’ 0 .001 ’∗∗ ’ 0 .01 ’∗ ’ 0 .05 ’ . ’ 0 . 1
Adj . R−Squared : 0 .23081
DW = 1.09 , p−value = 0.7626
summary(FE)
Oneway ( i nd i v i dua l ) e f f e c t Within Model
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Err t−va l Pr(>| t | )
DebtRatio 0 .050 0 .022 2 .27 0.02477 ∗
YGap 0.316 0 .057 5 .59 1 .238 e−07 ∗∗∗
I n f l 0 .069 0 .047 1 .47 0.14322
−−−
Adj . R−Squared : 0 .22325
DW = 1.2365 , p−value = 1.615 e−06
summary(Ran)
Oneway ( i nd i v i dua l ) e f f e c t Random Ef f e c t Model
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Err t−va l Pr(>| t | )
( I n t e r c ep t ) −3.856 0 .613 −6.29 3 .834 e−09 ∗∗∗
DebtRatio 0 .026 0 .014 1 .90 0.05984 .
YGap 0.298 0 .056 5 .33 3 .853 e−07 ∗∗∗
I n f l 0 .080 0 .046 1 .75 0.08270 .
−−−
Sign . codes : 0 ’∗∗∗ ’ 0 .001 ’∗∗ ’ 0 .01 ’∗ ’ 0 .05 ’ . ’ 0 . 1
Adj . R−Squared : 0 .22624
DW = 1.167 , p−value = 0.7626
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2) For the separated responses before and after 2004:
summary( poolSep )
Oneway ( i nd i v i dua l ) e f f e c t Pool ing Model
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Err t−va l Pr(>| t | )
( I n t e r c ep t ) −3.728 0 .466 −8.00 4 .372 e−13 ∗∗∗
I ( DebtRatio∗DumBA) 0.013 0 .014 0 .93 0.35237
I ( DebtRatio∗DumAA) 0.020 0 .011 1 .84 0.06855 .
YGap 0.279 0 .057 4 .87 2 .959 e−06 ∗∗∗
I n f l 0 .127 0 .052 2 .43 0.01655 ∗
−−−
Sign . codes : 0 ’∗∗∗ ’ 0 .001 ’∗∗ ’ 0 .01 ’∗ ’ 0 .05 ’ . ’ 0 . 1
Adj . R−Squared : 0 .23088
DW = 1.095 , p−value = 0.7626
summary(FESep)
Oneway ( i nd i v i dua l ) e f f e c t Within Model
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Err t−va l Pr(>| t | )
I ( DebtRatio∗DumBA) 0.060 0 .027 2 .22 0.02826 ∗
I ( DebtRatio∗DumAA) 0.052 0 .022 2 .33 0.02143 ∗
YVAR 0.318 0 .057 5 .61 1 .161 e−07 ∗∗∗
I n f l 0 .054 0 .052 1 .04 0.30065
−−−
Sign . codes : 0 ’∗∗∗ ’ 0 .001 ’∗∗ ’ 0 .01 ’∗ ’ 0 .05 ’ . ’ 0 . 1
Adj . R−Squared : 0 .22365
DW = 1.2377 , p−value = 1.252 e−06
summary(RANSep)
Oneway ( i nd i v i dua l ) e f f e c t Random Ef f e c t Model
C o e f f i c i e n t s :
Estimate Std . Err t−va l Pr(>| t | )
( I n t e r c ep t ) −3.846 0 .608 −6.33 3 .225 e−09 ∗∗∗
I ( DebtRatio∗DumBA) 0.025 0 .017 1 .48 0.14099
I ( DebtRatio∗DumAA) 0.026 0 .014 1 .87 0.06335 .
YVAR 0.298 0 .056 5 .29 4 .594 e−07 ∗∗∗
I n f l 0 .082 0 .052 1 .59 0.11532
−−−
Sign . codes : 0 ’∗∗∗ ’ 0 .001 ’∗∗ ’ 0 .01 ’∗ ’ 0 .05 ’ . ’ 0 . 1
Adj . R−Squared : 0 .2246
DW = 1.1649 , p−value = 0.7626
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